PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

**Sector Commander Warning Order**



UNAC Sector 2 HQ

Faron

xx M+4 20xx

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION CARANA (UNAC)**

**SECTOR 2 HQ**

**WARNING ORDER (WARNO) 01/ 20xx**

**References:**

1. **UNSCR 1544**
2. **OPORD FHQ**
3. **Deployment Maps**
4. **SITUATION**
   1. **General Political and Strategic Situation.** On 19 May 2006, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), Ref A, was signed between the country’s government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.
      1. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured armed forces. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.
      2. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who provided an Observer Mission called the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to observe the implementation of the KPA. Additionally the GNR invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rimosa border to counter Islamist extremism.

* + 1. UNSCR 2300 (2015), Ref B, authorizes an integrated mission, the UN Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) to assist the GNR to implement the provisions of the KPA. CRCAC military personnel will be incorporated within UNAC but not Op INTRÉPIDE.
    2. The ceasefire has held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict.
    3. The GNR is struggling with its responsibilities and there are security vacuums. Even when in power the previous government struggled to provide law and order outside the rebel held areas. Police presence is very low, they are under-resourced and were heavily politicized under the previous regime. So there are areas still controlled by the regime, areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority have ceased to exist. Crime rates are high, organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs, in Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police and in Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA).
    4. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 1000,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas.
    5. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, however those with Katasi have been strained as Carana accused Katasi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the Combatants.
  1. **General Military Situation and Assessment of Armed Groups**.
     1. Following the signing of the KPA, the MPC, CISC and the government Carana Defence Forces (CDF) have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made. While no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.
     2. Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). The MPC is a well-structured and efficient military opposition that has achieved some local success over the CDF and has appeared better prepared than many of its CDF counterparts. It has gained increasing support from the local population in its area of influence. It currently has no aspirations beyond the western provinces. The official HQ of MPC is in Alur and following the ceasefire, this has increased in importance and become a basic administrative centre for the region as the MPC take over government and basic administrative functions providing some basic needs and security for the population in the West. However, the MPC has no coherent political strategy other than the removal of the Ogavo government (now achieved) and better representation for non-Caran ethnicities although it is now developing a political platform on which to campaign in the elections. The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000 fighters, since the ceasefire 5000 have returned home but are on short notice to return to their formations if required.

Assessment:

Most Likely: The MPC leadership continue to support the KPA, this will include disarming their combatants in expectation of the inclusion of some of their fighters in the reformed CDF. Continue representation in the GNR and participate in the elections

Most Dangerous: MPA lose faith in the KPA and a multi-ethnic government and return to political and military confrontation with the Government with aspirations for the separation of the western provinces from Carana.

Response to UNAC Deployment: MPC will remain supportive as long as UNAC is seen as impartial and effective

* + 1. Combattants Indpéndants de Sud Carana (CISC). The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels of diverse backgrounds. Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by force. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training. However, an influx of experienced, extremist, foreign fighters upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations before the treaty. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population, due to its military successes and reaction against the brutality of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign, which indiscriminately targeted Tatsis in the Southern region. The CISC also regularly abducts civilians to bolster its ranks. Its area of influence is confined to Leppko Province, with less influence on the Leppko coast.

Assessment:

Most Likely: Within the limitations or its organisational capability, CISC will support the KPA and accept GNR governance and the expansion of law and order into Leppko Province. Due to a record of CISC atrocities, few combatants are likely to be accepted into the CDF, those rejected may return to the field in splinter groups. These will continue violence against non-Tatsi, non-Muslim populations.

Most Dangerous: Spurred on the foreign radical Islamist fighters and external support the CISC becomes more radical and more capable. CISC resumes operations against Carana forces in order to allow it the freedom of manoeuvre to conduct its own operations against Caran and other minorities in order to secure the primacy of Tatsi, Muslim authority.

Response to UNAC Deployment: CISC are unlikely to welcome UNACs presence, particularly as they are already under the vigilance of Op INTRÉPIDE in the SW of Leppko Province. Some elements are likely to be hostile to UNAC and force protection will need to be increased accordingly.

* + 1. Other Groups. There are a number of relatively small armed groups / armed criminal gangs who have taken advantage of the security vacuum and operate in their local areas. They were not part of the KPA process and are likely to continue their activities until UN / Carana Government security deployments prevent them. In the coal mining area of Akkabar, the miners are in open conflict with the national police and have also attacked government institutions. Although not and armed group, the miners have links to criminal cartels are a major destabilising influence in Hanno Province.
  1. Government Security Forces. These security forces, while national, have developed over nearly 30 years of government by President Ogavo into Caran dominated entities and no longer representative of the country. The KPA has identified their reform as an essential part of peace.
     1. Carana Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF is the state security apparatus and has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). Prior to the KPA, the chiefs of the service reported direct to the president. The navy has a small number of coastal and river patrol boats. The air force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few, un-operational light bombers, has a limited strike capacity. The main military force in the CDF is the army, which equipped with light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, Armored Personnel Carriers, Artillery Guns and Mortars, Missile Launchers and Anti-Aircraft Guns. Some of this equipment is very old and much is in considerable need of repair. The CDF have maintained their positions after the ceasefire with four battalions opposite the MPC in the West and three facing the CISC in the South-West. The battalions in the South West have a history of perpetuating acts of politicide, ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations.

Assessment: The CDF are too Caran dominated to be considered an impartial force. As the national force, they are not required to disarm within the terms of the KPA, but they need be to be closely monitored, particularly in Leppko Province. The reduction in the numbers of soldiers currently in the CDF, to make way for the entry of MPC and CISC combatants and the reform of the CDF to become an multi-ethic force is likely to create its own tensions and will need to be planed carefully with the Carana government.

* + 1. Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard is approximately 1500 strong, based in Galasi and fiercely loyal to President Ogavo. The President has been in hiding since April 2015, accompanied by elements of the Guard.

Assessment: The Presidential Guard elements remaining in Galasi are not part of the CDF and are potential spoilers – particularly if President Ogavo, indicted by the ICC and the GNR, reappears.

* + 1. Carana National Police (CNP). The Police consists of the CNP who are largely located in population centres and report to the Ministry of Interior, and the Gendarmerie in the rural areas who report to the Ministry of Defence and also have responsibility for border security – both have been traditional seen as enforces of Ogavo’s repressive regime and as such disliked and not trusted by much of the population. There are 10,000 CNP and Gendarmerie, although numbers have decreased through desertions and assassinations by anti-Ogavo elements. The Police are ill-trained, poorly paid, ill equipped and have bad morale.

Assessment: The CNP and Gendarmerie are very unlikely to be accepted into MPC or CISC controlled areas and a very different police force will be required if it is to acceptable throughout Carana.

* 1. Friendly and Cooperating Organisations.
     1. CRC and CRCAC. The CRC will continue to support the KPA and endeavour to restrain any unsupportive actions by Katasi and Rimosa. The CRCAC military members will be subsumed into UNAC provided they meet the UN standards.
     2. Op INTRÉPIDE. The French mission terminates after 6 months. UNAC will need to establish liaison and coordination in preparation for assuming control of their Area of Responsibility.
     3. UN Country Team (UNCT). UNDP lead the country team, which is based in Galasi. The UNCT are represented in most parts of Carana but due to the security situation they are unable to access some areas to conduct a needs assessment and then provide support.
     4. NGOs and ICRC. A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and women’s issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), are present in Galasi, Corma and Alur.
  2. United Nations Direction. The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. The tasks for UNAC are to:

* Support the implementation of the KPA
* Protect civilians including humanitarians and human rights defenders
* Support humanitarian and Human Rights assistance
* Support Security reform
* Support the implementation of the peace process including elections

Mission end-state is a democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces sufficiently able to protect all its civilians and where human rights are respected.

1. **MISSION**

**UNAC Sector 2 units are to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in their AORs in accordance to UNSCR 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.**

**3**. **EXECUTION**

**a. COMMANDER’S INTENT**

**To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II).**

**Battalion Commanders to conduct a Mission Analysis for your AOR and brief this SHQ on 03NOV17 at 0900H on the Risk Analysis of the threat identified in your AOR, a summary of possible COAs in all phases of response and additional resources you may need to execute your operations.**

**4**. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

TBD after unit’s Mission Analysis (MDMP) are reviewed by SHQ.