PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

**DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive**

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**Planning for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Carana**

## SITUATION

* The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the Government can no longer control significant portions of the country and increasingly armed and extremist elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders splintering away from the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and the ethnic and religious tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas.
* The worst case scenario would see the current stalemate sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a *de* *facto* breakup of the country under individual factions; while the latter may be a viable option in the eyes of the MPC, it is not so in CISC areas, which would witness a further deterioration of law and order. The just-concluded Kalari peace agreement offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.
* The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward including its efforts to promote the Kalari peace agreement. The functions of its light observer mission (CRCAC) will be folded into the UN peacekeeping operation and most of the observers will be re-designated to participate in this new mission. So long as the French force ‘Operation Intrepide’ remains in Southern Carana, the peacekeeping operation will need to establish clear lines of cooperation and liaison.
* Key aspects of the new agreement include:
  + The establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation;
  + Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
  + Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
  + Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
  + Respect for human rights;
  + Disarmament and demobilization of armed groups;
  + Restructured military police and intelligence capacities.

United Nations Security Council Resolution xxx of 3 June xxxx confirmed the Council’s readiness to establish a UN peacekeeping operation to support the implementation of the Kalari Agreement and a long-term political settlement.

* DPKO has assumed lead responsibility for planning of the UN operation and an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been established.
* The operational imperative is to ensure that the UN system is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission to support the new Kalari agreement. The conditions to deploy are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences both for the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.
* The plan produced under DPKO’s leadership must synchronize the immediate stabilization objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long term stability in Carana.

**STRATEGIC DIRECTION**

* The strategic direction, as derived from the Secretary-General and the Security Council, will be as follows:

“The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence”.

* This constitutes the UN system’s objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:
  + Supporting political dialogue at national and sub-national levels to foster an inclusive and viable peace agreement and its implementation;
  + Supporting security and stabilization in key contested areas; and
  + Completing the establishment and operationalization of full Mission capacity in key areas.

**STAKEHOLDERS**

* Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. At HQ, the full involvement of the agencies, funds and programs in the work of the ITF is critical from the outset.
* In the field, it is essential to ensure that:   
  + The Government of National Reconciliation is included and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties;
  + The CRC remains engaged as a full partner in the process;
  + Individual Member States, international and regional organizations and donors, who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort, are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

* The cooperation of the Government of National Reconciliation is required for meaningful planning to take place, and that all parties agree not to put obstacles in the way of a UN deployment.
* Other assumptions:
  + That military and police personnel required for a possible United Nations operation in Carana will be forthcoming from troop and police contributing countries, and will be deployed as per SCR XXX.
  + That only those tasks that are clearly indicated by this directive will be included in the planning; any additional tasks should be the subject of a separate recommendation and approved by DPKO.
  + That the Kalari peace agreement will be the basis for meaningful change in Carana and that it will receive full and timely international support.
  + That the humanitarian operation currently taking place in Carana will continue.
  + That the CRC will support UN efforts to ensure that Carana’s neighbours do not interfere in the internal affairs of Carana.

**CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS**

* The following targets represent what we need to achieve:  
  + Deployment of a Technical Assessment Mission within 14 days of the signing of a peace agreement;
  + Deployment of a peacekeeping mission within 90 days of a Security Council resolution;
  + Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis within six months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution. Stabilisation will occur when it is no longer necessary to provide emergency relief;
  + Cessation of hostilities as specified by the Kalari peace agreement;
  + Implementation of the terms of the peace agreement as specified by that agreement;
  + Commencement of a programme of disarmament and demobilization of armed groups within three months of the peace agreement, and completion within 12 months;
  + Completion of planning for support to an election process within 12 months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution;
  + Return of all IDPs and refugees within two years, and provision for displaced voters to participate in the election should it occur before they are able to return.

**CONSTRAINTS**

* The general state of the Caranian infrastructure presents significant operational and logistical challenges and road movement can become a major problem in the rainy reason, particularly in the more remote parts of the country; this will require that the movement of goods and personnel be carried out by air, particularly by helicopter at certain times of the year.
* The timeline that has been established by the Kalari peace agreement envisages elections within 12 months; this will place us and the Government of National Reconciliation under significant pressure. On one hand we will need to have our plans to support the electoral process in place in good time, and on the other we must be prepared for a contingency should the date for the elections slip.
* The scenario described in the previous point is likely to be complicated because the Government of National Reconciliation will initially lack the capability to undertake its own responsibilities, both in preparing for elections and also potentially in other areas such as disarmament and security sector reform.

**PROCESS**

* Planning for the deployment of the peacekeeping operation will be led from United Nations Headquarters, under the direction of the Carana Planning Team that has been established for this purpose.
* The process will be guided by the Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP), whose major benchmarks and outputs include:
* The Mission Concept and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF);
* The Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council;
* Security Council resolutions;
* Establishment of an Integrated Mission Headquarters;
* Assumption of operational planning responsibilities by the Mission HQ; and
* Validation and endorsement of the Mission Concept.

**TIMELINE**

* Draft Mission Plan: one week prior to technical assessment mission,
* Technical Assessment Mission: Within 21 days of the signing of a peace agreement,
* Secretary-General submits a report to the Security Council: three weeks after return of technical assessment mission,
* Mission Concept: 21 days after Secretary-General’s report to Security Council
* Integrated Strategic Framework: 100 days after the establishment of the mission,
* Establishment of the mission headquarters, augmented by the temporary deployment of the ITF within five weeks of the Security Council resolution.

**RESPONSIBILITIES & DEADLINES**

DPKO / ITF:

* The head of the Carana Planning Team and DPKO chair of the ITF is responsible to the USG and is to lead all UN planning activities during the foundation and operational planning phases until a USG Directive to the SRSG is issued to guide an integrated peace support operation in Carana. S/he is also responsible for ensuring the substantive integration of all relevant dimensions of UN system involvement.
* The DPKO chair of the ITF is to provide the USG with an initial presentation for the Security Council on options for an integrated peace support operation in Carana immediately on the return of the technical assessment mission.
* S/he is to lead a technical assessment mission to Carana at the earliest opportunity.
* S/he is to produce recommendations for the Secretary-General on the structure, size and concept of an integrated peace support operation in Carana to the Security Council within 21 days of return from the technical assessment, or as directed by the USG.
* S/he is to present a final draft for an integrated peace support operation in Carana within 28 days of return from the technical assessment mission, or as directed by the USG.
* She/he is to ensure that throughout the planning there is full compliance with Decision No. 2008/24 of the Policy Committee of 26 October 2008 on human rights in integrated missions.

SRSG

* Once a SRSG has been appointed and the USG DPKO has issued a directive, s/he will assume the lead for planning for the mission in Carana.

**INTEGRATION OF ALL UN EFFORTS IN CARANA**

* A critical function of the Mission Concept is to integrate the work of all Mission components behind clearly-established mission-wide priorities to ensure maximum coherence and unity of effort. Individual components of the Mission - substantive, military, police and support - will be expected to align their respective Concepts of Operation on the basis of the Mission Concept.
* The UNCT will participate actively in, and contribute to, the planning process in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination and consistency in the development of the UN system-wide response. This involvement is in addition to that of the UNDG and ECHA planning capacities and individual agencies represented on the IMTF.
* A comprehensive strategic communication strategy will be developed in consultation with UN partners as soon as possible. This strategy should be implemented well in advance of the UN mission assuming responsibility. The strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with regard to the role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Carana.