PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

**Report of the UN Technical Survey**

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**REPORT OF THE**

**UN TECHNICAL SURVEY**

**OF CARANA**



**Xxx 20xx**

## Political

Overview

Despite the signing of the CRC –brokered Kalari Treaty (Peace Agreement), and the presence of the CRC observer mission CRCAC, Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has little control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration’s real power had been limited and its replacement, the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), has not yet been able to change these facts on the ground. An increasing level of public resistance is challenging the limited resources of the government’s security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent.

**GNR**

The Kalari Treaty called for the establishment of an ethnically representative Government of National Reconciliation pending the Presidential and national elections which will elect a new government. The GNR is now in place and struggling with its responsibilities.

Under the provisions for the Treaty, effective power is in the hands of a consensus Prime Minister. Lucien Langata, or LL as he is known, was a member of the PDC and Finance Minister until he took a stand against corruption in the mid 2000s. Narrowly escaping execution due to his popular following amongst the Caran, LL refused to leave Carana and President Ogavo had allowed him to live in relative obscurity. He is considered a popular and sensible choice for care-taker Prime Minister and enjoys sufficient support across the country to have a reasonable chance of pulling the GNR together.

While nominally still President, Ogavo has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and now by the GNR for corruption. Unfortunately, he has disappeared and was last seen in Rimosa in late April. He is believed to be protected by a group of hard line former members of the Presidential Guard, most of whom still remain in Carana, based in the capital Galesi. Depending on the Guards loyalty, this nexus could potentially disrupt the peace process since there is neither the will nor the capability within the former security forces to track Ogavo down.

Political Parties

Carana has been essentially a one party state represented by the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC). Years of repression have destroyed any effective and legitimate opposition, or have driven it underground; any legitimate opposition capability is so fragmented that it is unlikely to be politically viable for some time.

Those opposition groups that do exist tend to be relatively insignificant, ethnically-based and provincial; this includes some communist groups in the capital and Maldosa, as well as Kori ethnic minority groups on the coast and the Tatsi grouping in the South. However, these groups are not organised and have little importance because of their narrow interest and small following. Other groups having some political influence are the coal and copper miners’ trade unions, which are mainly interest-based.

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of the MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it could become an effective political force. It enjoys broad cross-confessional public support in the west through its ability to be seen to address the concerns and needs of the people where the government has failed.

In contrast the CISC currently lacks the structure or organization that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the excesses and religious discrimination of the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Caran minority in Leppko province. It has never made an attempt to capitalise on its potential nor articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated and radicalized when it sees itself marginalised.

Carana has no political diaspora or organised groups in exile.

Elections

While the Kalari Treaty calls for elections within 12 months, the current highly unstable security situation could threaten the credibility and legitimacy of such an ambitious electoral process.

After years of human rights violations, sectarian discrimination, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Potential political opposition groups will be hard pressed to organise themselves in time to conduct an effective election campaign; this could result in calls to delay the elections, or attempts to subvert the electoral process itself. Nevertheless, the timeline for elections was a crucial element in the peace negotiations. There will be considerable pressure on the GNR to manage this process.

Another significant factor is the absence of an accurate census: the last national census having taken place in 1990. When combined with the large scale displacement of the population, voter registration will be a long, complex and costly exercise.

If all parties honour the commitments of the Kalari Treaty, it can be hoped that the MPC will participate in future elections and evolve into a legitimate political party. The long-term political role of the CISC is uncertain. A further uncertainty is the potential emergence of hitherto unidentified groups, some extremist, which are not signatories to the Kalari Treaty. Whether they join the political process or oppose it, there is a real danger of further political instability, leading to an increased violence and the ensuing security risks to the elections.

**DDR**

The requirement for all parties to the conflict to disarm is stated in the Kalari Treaty. It can be assumed that the MPC will honour this commitment if all parties adhere to the Treaty, especially in view of its political aspirations and its expectations for its fighters to be included within the restructured national armed forces.

Whilst there are no indications that CISC will not disarm in accordance with the Kalari Treaty, the lack of a proper organizational structure and the inherent lack of discipline within the various splinter factions will make it a high risk process. It is evident that some factions have become radicalized by Islamist extremists, and probable some factions will see themselves being disadvantaged, leading to freelance military activity, which may have sectarian, religious, political, or criminal motivation. Many of these CISC soldiers have also been involved in systematic sexual violence against Christian women, girls and young boys in reprisal for similar and historical CDF excesses against the Tatsi Muslim population. It is therefore difficult to determine how the integration of these armed groups will be perceived by the population in the affected areas. In the CISC group, there is also a high percentage of women and girls who have been abducted and now live with the militia. In effect, these women and girls also constitute the logistics and healthcare of the CISC military structure. A further complication is that these women are not welcome back into their original villages.

By extension, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of any other armed groups which have no allegiance to any group, are not signatories of the Kalari Treaty and which focus is largely extremist or criminal.

**Constitution and Judicial System**

The Constitution and judicial system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles. Violations of human rights and other legal shortcomings stem from a systematic abuse and exploitation of the existing rules by the Ogava regime.

Under the “State of Emergency” (see below) a system of mixed civilian/military courts with very limited rights of appeal has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crime.

A number of human rights organisations have issued reports outlining arrests, detentions and executions without due legal process. There are also reports of torture, including sexual abuse and rape, and uninvestigated deaths in the prisons. Many of the detainees are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions generally give cause for concern and official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain. The ICRC has limited access to only the main prison in Galasi. There are reliable reports of children being detained with adults as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. Some of the women have their infants with them. In general, prisoners are treated harshly, conditions are inhumane, nutrition is inadequate and there is little or no medical assistance. No information is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in CDF military holding facilities. Equally, the rebels are known to be holding many detainees.

**Human Rights**

Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Against Torture. It has also ratified the Statute of the ICC.

The Constitution states that all laws must be consistent with Carana’s international human rights obligations. It underlines that these rights should be upheld regardless of gender, ethnic group or creed. In reality, Carana legislation contains many laws inherited from the colonial period, which are incompatible with international human rights standards – for instance the Carana criminal procedure code. The Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights. It is silent on other rights such as economic, social and cultural rights.

Currently, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Carana government has declared a “State of Emergency” which permits it to override the constitutional provisions, including its human rights elements. In 2013, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Carana. The Special Rapporteur has visited the country on a number of occasions and has sharply criticised all parties to the conflict for human rights abuses perpetuated against civilians generally, and women in particular. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict has also visited Carana and highlighted the disturbingly large number of children used in combat roles by rebel elements as well as by the national army.

The Carana Government does not have a human rights ministry – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. In 2008, the National Human Rights Commission was established. The commission is not compliant with the international standards for a national human rights institution as set out in the “Paris Principles”. Carana has a number of active human rights NGOs, including women’s and youth groups, whose freedom to operate has been inhibited by the fear of reprisals, but with the change in the situation they are becoming increasingly vocal. A number of international humanitarian NGOs are also represented in the country.

**Gender Specific Considerations: Women**

Carana holds 130th place in the Gender Development index ranking of Gender Development index and has high mortality rates in childbirth and low literacy rates for women. As many men are working in the mines or manufacturing industry as well as being forcefully recruited to the military organizations, women are largely left with responsibility for small-scale farming to support extended families. This distribution of labour, which leaves many women vulnerable to threats, has resulted in their increased political awareness.

In parliament, however, women represent only 8% of members, which makes it difficult for their concerns to be heard. In public life women have held posts generally associated with assistance, i.e. women’s affairs, health, etc. and have not been in decision-making positions. The only official women’s organization is the women’s wing of PDC which has advocated a return to traditional roles for women and men.

With the new political situation, women are mobilizing at the grass-root level.

In the past, the State used abduction and rape to stigmatize and undermine female political involvement. The only women’s organizations that could operate addressed less overt political issues such as children’s issues (i.e. education, nutrition). However, there were women’s organizations in the conflict-affected areas helping victims of sexual violence. These women’s groups report high levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse, especially in the IDP camps.

Systematic sexual violence was used in some of the conflict-affected areas. The CISC is one of the main perpetrators of violence resulting from their poor command and control structures. The CDF and law enforcement agencies are also responsible for sexual violence against civilians of the Kori and Tatsi ethnic groups. The conflict seems to have exacerbated the trafficking of women and children both internally and to neighboring countries. Trafficking in humans is related to the trafficking of weapons and drugs, all three of which have been used by the warring parties to continue the conflict.

**Gender Specific Considerations: Men**

Given the high crime rates, a large number of young men are being killed in crime related violence such as riots or gang fights. Men’s health is also negatively affected by the working conditions in the mines and manufacturing industry. Trade unions have not been able to address this situation effectively, partly because of their political involvement in the conflict. Sanitary conditions in the shanty towns are poor with high levels of alcoholism and drug addiction as well as HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. In the southern and western areas, affected by conflict, there is often forced recruitment of men, particularly the very young. As a result, many men are leaving the country with their families being left behind. Men involved in the political struggle can be subjected to violence with reports of sexual torture and rape being used against political prisoners. In the southern region, civilian men of the Caran minority are the main target of violence by the CISC. Similarly, civilian men of the Kori and Tatsi are targeted by the CDF in their campaigns.

**The Situation with Regard to Girls and Boys**

The political conflict along with a deteriorating economy has had a grave impact on the young population, of which 44 % is under the age of 15. Both girls and boys leave school to help support their families. Forced genital mutilation of girls in their early teens, though illegal, is practiced extensively by both the Kori and the Tatsi There has been extensive abuse of both boys and girls throughout the conflict by all parties. The CISC are the main culprits for abductions but also sections of the CDF have been reported to be responsible. This high degree of violence toward girls, boys and women has prompted public discussion about the need to fight violence against women in the society at large.

**Security**

Overview

The level of general security in Carana is very low as a result of the intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, the sectarian tensions, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence outside of the capital and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest is widespread and occurs on a regular basis. The level of crime is high and there is evidence that much of it, especially in the sectors of diamonds and narcotics, is both organized and transnational. Overall, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as “Medium Risk”. Some areas, such as the territory around Galasi, as well as Hanno and Leppko Provinces, have to be assessed as “High to Very High Risk”. Male abductees of all ages are often coerced into the fighting forces and girls and women are used as what amounts as slaves, including being forced to become “wives” of combatants. These women are also at times forced to participate in outright fighting. If they refuse they are killed. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are commonplace and are used to intimidate.

Since March, at the invitation of the GNR, there has been an emergency deployment of a French force “Opération Intrépide” along the Rimosa border in the South West mountains. Their stabilizing effect is still uncertain. Of limited duration (6 months) the operation is designed to neutralize the emerging threat of extremist Islamic activity operating either side of the Carana/Rimosa border. The question remains, however, whether the stability they can bring to this region can be sustained once they withdraw.

Galasi

In Galasi the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of male youth, of up to 100 in number, rule the streets. These gangs pose a threat even to unwary military formations. There is increasing evidence that their activities are organized and are funded by trafficking in narcotics and women. Within the IDP camps there is a high level of crime, mostly as a result of poverty and hopelessness, but this has been on the decline recently since the appearance of vigilante groups who dispense their own form of summary justice.

Akkabar

In Akkabar the coal mine workers went on strike in May 2015 as they had not been paid for four months. These men live in shantytowns in poor conditions, separated from their families. What started as an industrial dispute soon escalated into open conflict after excess use of force by the police resulting in the death of several miners. In reaction, some miners have subsequently attacked a number of government institutions, particularly police stations and banks. Much of this may well be inspired by the criminal cartels. Activity is sporadic and often spontaneous but it has increasing local support.

Leppko

The breakdown of government authority in Leppko province has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups, that together with CISC combatants, have preyed on the Kori and Caran elements of the local population. Much of this violence is radicalized and sectarian in nature. Many of these groups are former Elassi rebels from neighbouring Rimosa who have taken advantage of the unstable situation in Carana. Links between the CISC and these groups are denied by the CISC but several independent reports indicate such links exist. These groups are involved in the organised smuggling of weapons,drugs and women. It is hoped that Opération Intrépide will bring a needed degree of stability to the mountainous border areas.

**Military**

General Situation

Following the signing of the Kalari Treaty the signatory combatants have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made, and each fearful that the other side might renege on its commitments. This has resulted in an unstable stalemate in a number of areas and, while no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Therefore disengagement, separation and a start to the disarmament process are high priorities. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.

Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The CDF have remained in their positions after the ceasefire. Four infantry battalions remained deployed along the separation line between CDF and MPC, and an additional three deployed in the South in Corma, Maldosa and North Leppko. The Airborne Battalion, in conjunction with Gendarmerie units, is deployed in the city of Maroni to handle the riots of the coal miners. The engineer units and the Reconnaissance Company are co-located in the North West with the Infantry Units. The location of the Artillery Battalion and the Air Defence Units is unknown.

The six Alpha Jets of the Carana Air Force can be assessed as non-operational. The helicopters have been used frequently for air patrols.

According to our own observations, the logistic situation for the CDF appears poor. Spare parts seem to be a particular problem.

The CDF has a reputation of not respecting international humanitarian law, with reported cases of sexual violence. This is primarily true of the CDF positioned in the South where historically there has been a sectarian element to their excesses.

MPC

Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 mainly male soldiers (including their families and dependants) from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line. While this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to trigger an engagement with the CDF whether by mistake or by design.

After the end of the formal fighting, the official HQ in Alur increased in importance and has become a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in Alur.

The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but has repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of children. As a result of broad public support and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the West.

CISC

During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels are living in their home villages and group only occasionally.

The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that their number has not changed and remains in the region of 3000 active male fighters.

Hitherto the CISC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support. However, recently there have been reports of several acts of what appears to be extremist violence against ethnic minorities in the south of Leppko adjacent to the border with Rimosa. It is not clear whether members of the CISC have been involved, which would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether these acts are the responsibility of radicalized splinter groups that are not signatories. In any case, civilians from the Caran and other minorities in the region seem to be the target.

Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by the use of force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Police

The concept of conventional policing is almost non-existent. In government controlled areas the police, both National Police and Gendarmerie, are viewed as elements to only enforce government policy and protect government interests. In the remainder of the country the police are targeted as they are so closely identified with the repressive Ogavo regime. Consequently, many have been killed, and others have either fled or changed allegiance. As a result, law and order is either maintained, or not, by the dominant militia group in any given area. In some areas, such as those in which the MPC has asserted control, a quasi capacity to maintain law and order exists. In others, mainly in the south, there is none at all. Certain crimes – such as domestic violence or Gender Based Violence – are not addressed at all by the police. Reporting sexual violence to the police entails the risk of renewed attack by the police itself, as the victim is sometimes considered as guilty as the perpetrator.

Where police do exist they are ill-trained, poorly paid, or not paid at all, with low morale. The result is that corruption remains endemic. Police stations have little equipment and that which they do have is of military origin and entirely unsuitable for a democratic police force. Police training, especially human rights training, has virtually ceased. To compound the problem the existing police structure is so identified with President Ogavo that no member of it would be accepted in the MPC or CISC controlled areas. Effectively this means that the South is lawless.

Economy

Prior to the civil war, the Caranian economy was already suffering from over a decade of negative growth due to excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. It continued to deteriorate during the war which brought the production of copper to a halt and saw much of the diamond production hijacked by a number of criminal groups. The flow of foreign currency reduced to a trickle, and what did exist was mostly used to buy weapons or was misappropriated. Fighting in rural areas meant that the timber industry was reduced to approximately 20% of its pre-conflict capacity and agricultural production fell to approximately 40-50%. The net result has been an inflation rate that has been running somewhere around 300% and a significantly reduced supply of basic commodities. The warfare in the countryside has also affected the small-scale farming used to support many women who are heads-of-household. This concerns widows as well as wives of men who are working in the mines or the manufacturing industry.

The result is an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, which has only been prevented from becoming a major crisis by external aid and reliance on a subsistence economy. Inevitably the consequences are most acute in the major towns where increasing social dissatisfaction frequently erupts into violence.

**Infrastructure**

Roads

Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighbouring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but most roads are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles up to approx 20 tons. Those along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

Railways

The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both operational but degraded. Currently the Galasi to Akkabar line can go no further than Maroni as the main railway bridge was destroyed by flooding in 2010 and has yet to be repaired.

There are rail yards at Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa capable of handling containers, vehicles and other goods. The station in Mia is specialised for the transport of copper and has no freight handling facilities.

In common with the road network there has been little or no maintenance over the past few years, consequently the tracks are deteriorating and are likely to be subject to increasing restrictions both in terms of speed and capacity.

Harbours

In Carana there are three deep-water harbours and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped, can handle large ships and has a roll-on roll-off (RoRo) and container capability. This harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential UN Mission.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo or significant container capability but is equipped with operational cranes and can take break-bulk ships up to approximately 600 ft in length. However, there is only limited dock space without disrupting regular trade; this effectively limits capacity to no more than two ships above the routine shipping.

The harbour in Maldosa in the South is geared to specialised handling for the export of copper but has a similar capacity to Cereni for the handling of regular transport ships. Only two wharves are equipped with cranes which will limit capacity, and there is very limited parking or storage space due to the harbour being in the town; this being said there is ample space on the western outskirts. Currently, the French Opération Intrépide has its main supply routes coming through Katasi, where they historically have had a base and a permanent military presence. The UN will need to find alternatives to this arrangement.

Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material and has ample ramp space in excess of its routine requirements. Space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles in close proximity to the airport is limited, but generally it meets most requirements for the deployment of personnel and equipment.

Limitations on ramp space and cargo handling capacity restrict the capacity of the airport at Corma, however it has almost unlimited space close to the airport for storage/parking, and there are no significant limitations to the deployment of personnel. The French have a small logistic presence at Corma in support of Intrepide.

The airstrips in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

All other airstrips are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

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| **Airport** | **Paved**  **Runway** | **Runway length** | **Paved**  **Apron**  **(Sqm)** | **Instrument Approach**  **System** | **Loading**  **Equipment** |
| Galasi | Yes | 3200 m | 40 000 | Yes | Yes |
| Corma | Yes | 2700 m | 10 000 | Yes | Yes |
| Alur | Yes | 1500 m | - | No | No |
| Folsa | Yes | 1200 m | - | No | No |
| Amsan | Yes | 1200 m | - | No | No |
| Mia | No | 1100 m | - | No | No |

Electricity

There are three operational power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and two coal power plants in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners’ unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Since the power supply system is not designed as a network with redundancies, but organised on a regional oriented star pattern, the damage of one main line can cut supply to a large area. Accordingly, most of the country is currently without regular power supply.

Water

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies. In the more arid areas south west of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water is drawn mostly from small ponds and slow flowing brooks which are often of poor quality and a source of various water borne diseases. Daily collection of water is time-consuming and onerous, particularly for women. The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted, causing health problems for the men living in the surrounding shantytowns. These poor hygienic conditions are connected with a high infant mortality rate. Near the major rivers there is ample water supply but it still needs purification.

**Humanitarian**

Refugees and IDPs

The refugee and IDP situation remains unchanged from the information provided in the UN Country Team Report. IDPs are mainly women and their children and they mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in, or near, urban areas. The crime rate – such as murder, rape, domestic violence and theft – is high in the camps. The situation concerning health and sanitation is poor.

There is also fear among the refugee/IDP women that the already agreed DDR process will lead to the reintegration into their villages or areas of the men who sexually abused them.

Nutrition

As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price of food and basic goods increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased over the last several years.

The most affected areas are north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni, where the situation has already reached a crisis.

Landmines

During the conflict between CDF and rebels, landmines were used intensively by all parties, yet the nature of the conflict and the forces involved meant that very little documentation was maintained. Consequently, mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission. There is an immediate need to identify the areas of highest risk, many of which are in the west of the country, and begin action to reduce the threat.

### The UN Country Team and Non-governmental Organisations in Carana

Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of NGOs operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organisations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years. However, despite the Kalari Agreement, the continued levels of background violence has meant that large tracts of Carana are no-go areas for international humanitarian organizations. There is no Country Team presence in Hanno or Leppko provinces (apart from Corma) due to the high level of violence.

**The UN Country Team in Carana consists of the following organizations:**

* **World Food Program (WFP)**

Responsible for food distribution programmes and maintains offices in Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa and Alur.

* **United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)**

The lead agency for programmes helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Folsa and Corma.

* **The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

Protects and assists refugees; it has offices in Galasi, and Alur

* **The World Health Organisation (WHO)**

Coordinates international health programmes; it has an office in Galasi.

* **The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**

A small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.

* **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**

Responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Representative is also the UN Resident Coordinator and chairs weekly UN country team meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above. She is currently the Designated Official for Security in Carana.

**NGOs**

A total of fifty international and local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and women’s issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), mandated to assist victims of war, is present in Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur.

**Public Information**

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers have been rigorously controlled by the government. There is no press freedom. Editors and journalists who have opposed the PDC have been imprisoned or have fled. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. Government approved national newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station out of Alur.

As a result of the war several radio and TV transmission stations were destroyed, effectively leaving large areas of the country without access to information or TV and radio programmes.

**Education**

Prior to the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed education systems in the region from primary through to tertiary levels. The effects of war and a declining economy have seriously degraded the system, reducing the overall number of schools, particularly at the primary level, and resulting in a general decline in the number of students, particularly female. The decrease in the number of female students and therefore female literacy is particularly acute, the causes of which are the levels of violence as well as cultural discrimination.

**Support**

Notwithstanding the poor economic situation in Carana, most basic goods and supplies are still available, although both quality and availability can be erratic. Local purchase to meet UN mission requirements is therefore uncertain.

Fuel, construction material and food can be purchased, or contracted, in country, although the rampant inflation rate and the potential of a UN deployment is already leading to escalating prices.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors.

There is an ample supply of timber which can be purchased from local dealers in the larger towns, but concrete and steel are only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Specialised construction materials such as plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. In addition, furniture of adequate quality is largely unavailable. Technical goods such as IT equipment, vehicles and spares are generally unavailable in country.

Transport services can be contracted in the Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa although a series of truck driver strikes during the last year has meant that service has become unpredictable. There are no vehicle or aircraft rental companies currently in Carana.

**Local Labour**

Given the increased levels of unemployment following the war, there is no shortage of unskilled, or semi-skilled labour. Availability of skilled labour has reduced as many professional people left the country during the war. In the former two categories only approximately 30% have any English, the remainder uses either French or local dialects.

**Banking**

The banking system is only operational in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa and it does not support electronic cash transfer in any location. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns, rudimentary banking functions do exist but these are of little practical significance.

**Availability of Real Estate**

In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, office and accommodation is available for rent, although much is sub-standard and suffering from a lack of basic maintenance and facilities, particularly water, sanitation and power.