PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

**Mission Concept of Operations**



The Mission Concept of Operations would be drafted by the Carana Peacekeeping Mission Planning Team as part of the Integrated and Assessment Planning process. The draft mission concept would be presented for approval to the USGs of DPKO and DFS after the mandate has been issued by the Security Council. It uses the template from Reference A below.



/LM2D-0790

Date M+2

### UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

References:

1. DPKO / DFS Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Missions dated 01 January 2017.
2. UN Integrated Strategy on Carana (notional)
3. Kalari Peace Treaty (KPA) dated 19 May 2017.

D. DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive, Planning for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Carana, dated 21 May 2017.

E. Report of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to Carana, 31 May 2017.

F. UN Security Council Resolution 1544 (draft).

*Summary: This Mission Concept defines the overall approach, priorities and sequencing of the mandated tasks of the UN Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) during its start-up period and beyond. The main focus of UNAC in the initial period will be (a) the deployment and establishment of the Mission and (b) supporting the implementation of Kalari Peace Agreement in accordance with UNSCR 2300*

1. **CONTEXT**
2. On 19 May 2017, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement, called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), was signed between the country’s government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.
3. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR). It commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured national armed force. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity, repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict. This KPA has an ambitious timeline for its implementation and UNAC will not be operational in Carana until several months after the agreement. The success of the KPA depends on continued political agreement between the parties and the confidence to DDR. UNACs early military presence in the areas were MPC face CDF and CISC face CDF will reduce the risk of confrontation, disarmament is unlikely before this time and thus subsequent events will be delayed. Elections within a year is a challenge as preconditions include sufficient security throughout Carana, UNAC will advise GNR on this issue and be prepared for postponement.
4. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who have provided the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire. CRC are likely to be supportive of UNAC, can influence the GNR and contribute to regional security. The UN’s Regional Representative will lead on coordination and cooperation with CRC informing UNAC.
5. GNR had already invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rimosa border with a 6-month mandate to counter Islamist activities. Op INTRÉPIDE will remain a separate Mission but UNAC will need to coordinate closely and prepare for the security vacuum left by their departure.
6. The ceasefire has largely held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict. The GNR, while mostly united, is struggling with its responsibilities, and there are security vacuums in the country. There are areas controlled by Carana National Police, Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and state security agencies; areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC; and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority barely function. UNAC cannot address all these issues in the initial deployment and priority must be given to maintaining political consent for the adoption of the KPA and avoiding a return to conflict.
7. Crime rates are high. Organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, GALASI, are under the control of youth gangs. In Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police. In addition to the military conflict there are longer term law and order challenges, a continued security vacuum will enable organized criminal groups to become stronger and harder to tackle in the long run. Efforts to support Carana in tackling these issues need to be identified early.
8. In Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving splinter elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA). The situation in MPC areas and CISC areas are substantially different and need individual approaches. Leppko province is likely to be an enduring security issue and will additionally involve engagement with Rimosa.
9. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 100,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. Some areas are not accessible to humanitarian agencies due to the security situation and UNAC has a role in enabling this access. UNAC will need to work closely with the Humanitarian sector to identify areas where we can assist. The return of refugees and IDPs to their homes will need to be carefully managed, and will be a factor in election planning.
10. The countries surrounding Carana are part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Samosa are traditionally good, however those with Katasi have been strained as Carana has accused Katasi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the CISC. The UN Regional representative will lead in this area but his office and UNAC will need a coordinated information strategy. UNAC will be unable to focus on border issues during the initial stages of the Mission but should support GNR in planning for future engagement.
11. **GUIDING PRINCIPLES**
12. **Consent of the Parties**. UNAC has been invited by GNR and the parties to the conflict. UNAC will work with GNR, at the strategic and operational level, to deliver security and stability for Carana. At the tactical level there are likely to be events where parties to the KPA try to restrain UNACs Freedom of Action, these will need to be tackled carefully with direction from UNAC HQ.
13. **Impartiality**. UNAC will be impartial, particularly in its actions in supporting the ceasefire and separation of forces. This means being even handed but being prepared to act robustly (politically and militarily) to any violations.
14. **Non Use of Force except in Self-Defence and Defence of the Mandate**. The ROE and DUF will make it clear how the military and police components can utilize force to achieve the mandated tasks.
15. **Other Success Factors**. Promotion of national and local ownership is key to the UN’s success in Carana and is a guideline for both UNAC and the UN Country Team. UNAC is supporting GNR both at the national and local level and must listen to their leadership and support their intent.
16. **OVERALL MISSION OBJECTIVES**
17. **UN Strategic Objective in Carana**. The overall objective of the UN in Carana is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united CARANA, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which IDPs and refugees can return home in safety and in dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.
18. **UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.**  UNACs plan to support the UN’s Strategic Objective in Carana is through the achievement of the following objective:
    1. To support the implementation of the KPA:

KPA irreversible as MPC and CISC no longer military entities, successful elections conducted and legitimate political processes recognized as the way to improve the conditions of all people in Carana.

* 1. To Protect Civilians:

Civilians able to move freely within Carana. Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs at a level that can be neutralized by Carana security forces.

* 1. To support Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

Security situation sufficient that UNCT and IO/NGOs can access all parts of Carana.

* 1. To support Security Sector Reform (SSR):

CDF, CNP and other security institutions on a path to being ethnically representative, effective and accountable security institutions, that operate under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights.

* 1. To support the wider implementation of the Peace Process.

Through dialogue and engagement and supporting the creation of a protective environment UNAC has enabled national and local stake holders to commit to the peace process

1. **UNAC End State.** A democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens and enable peacebuilding activities to continue
2. **KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS**
3. **Assumptions.**

* 1. The continued cooperation of the GNR and the continued consent of the parties to UNAC’s deployment.
  2. Sufficient access to Carana ports and airheads to enable force flow and sustainment.
  3. That Field Support elements can deploy and sustain to meet the Mission CONOPS.

1. **Risks and Mitigating Action.** 
   1. The parties return to conflict before UNAC deploys and there is no peace to keep**.** In this event UNAC will halt its deployment and await DPKO direction.
   2. The parties return to conflict while UNAC is deploying / deployed. UNAC will withdraw from confrontation areas but seek to contain the movement of MPC Eastwards and CISC Northwards in order to protect civilians. UNAC will not directly support CDF.
2. **MISSION PHASES – CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**
3. The CONOPS covers the initial deployment in tasks in detail and the remaining phases in outline. There are four phases:

Initial Deployment: (- M+90). Priority: Early influence on KPA.

Benchmarks include: Mission HQ and Field Offices established; UNAC leading JCC and JLTs; Initial military presence in likely areas of confrontation between the armed groups; Police presence in Galasi. DDR and SSR outline plans agreed.

Expansion: (M+91-M+180). Priority: Greater security presence throughout Carana.

Benchmarks include: Military Component at 80% of authorised strength with reach throughout Carana; Disarmament has begun; armed groups are cantoned, and 70% of CDF are in barracks; Humanitarian access to 60% of Carana. Election planning commenced.

Consolidation: (M+181 onwards until output achieved). Priority: Conditions set for Elections

Benchmarks include: Sufficient security for elections; military aspects of the KPA irreversible; MPC and CISC fully demobilized; FOM throughout Carana. Humanitarian access throughout Carana.

Capacity Building and Drawdown (tbc). Priority: CNP able to provide security throughout Carana. While capacity building will have begun earlier, Mission resources are now available to make this activity a main effort and implement the planning conducted earlier. Priority will be on CNP capability as this will drive the rate of drawdown. Bench marks to follow.

1. **Phase 1 – Initial Deployment**:
2. During the Initial Deployment Phase, UNAC will establish its HQ in GALASI in order to strengthen dialogue with GNR, government departments and national security bodies. It will assume the chair of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) in accordance with the KPA and support the GNR’s DDR programme.
3. It will establish close coordination and sharing of information with the UNCT and implement a Senior Leaders Forum.
4. The first UNAC Field Offices will be established in FARON and MUKA to engage with local authorities including the leadership of MPC and CISC.
5. After establishing a security presence in GALASI, the Military Component is to support the GNR to ensure that the military aspects of the KPA are implemented. It is to ensure Freedom of Movement of the JLTs so that the JCC has the situational awareness to respond quickly to any threats to the KPA. A return to civil war is the greatest threat to civilians. The Military Component is to deter, pre-empt and if necessary respond to breaches of the military aspects of the KPA, initially in areas where MPC and CDF and CISC and CDF are most likely to clash (hot

spots) but elsewhere as resources allow. Thereafter the Military Component will operate where it is best able to support the Mission Objectives.

1. CRCAC observers, who meet UN Standards, will be re-designated to UNAC as soon as UNAC’s capabilities permit.
2. Protection of Civilians is UNACs priority task and against which the Mission will be judged. UNAC will conduct actions across Tier 1 (Dialogue and Engagement), Tier II (Physical Protection) and Tier III (Establishing a Protective Environment) to mitigate the risks to civilians.
3. UNAC will build on the coordination with the UN Country Team and the humanitarian agencies to continue to identify areas where UNAC may support humanitarian access and human rights assistance access including, when requested, and as a last resort, the provision of security to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
4. UNAC will support the GNR’s SSR (identified in the KPA) in particular the restructuring of the police force and the formation of a new and restructured Carana military, both of these tasks will be in cooperation with the interested organisations and states.
5. Supporting the wider implementation of the Peace Process will include assisting the GNR to establish national authority throughout the country; assist in the preparation and conduct of national elections and

assist in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

1. **PRIORITIES**
2. In Phase 1 and onwards UNAC will focus on the following priorities:
   1. Protection of UN personnel and facilities. This is the top priority but for the police and military components it must be accepted that some risk must be taken in order to defend our mandate and protect civilians. This risk must be managed through thorough understanding the operational environment, planning, preparation and coordination.
   2. Protection of Civilians. At all times it is our responsibility to Protect Civilians all UNAC activities should have this as a central purpose. In the first instance the best way to protect civilians is to prevent a return to conflict. It is accepted that we have limited means and in Phase 1 a limited presence, this places an increased requirement for establishing and maintaining situational awareness so that capabilities can be in the right place at the right time to pre-empt threats to civilians.
   3. Monitoring the Ceasfire and Disengagement. This is the key activity in the KPA. Accurate and timely reporting of incidents to the JCC will enable early resolution. The military component must be prepared to deter, pre-empt and respond to incidents.
   4. Dialogue and Engagement. At Mission level and in the field we must constantly reach out to engage with government and other key actors, including the leaders of MPC and CISC. This engagement needs to be managed and coordinated so that the Mission speaks in one voice and is seen to be robust, impartial and here to help.
   5. Support to Humanitarians and Human Rights Assistance. UNAC will reach out humanitarian and Human Rights organisations, primarily through the DSRSG (HC) but also at Field Office level to identify how our capabilities can assist their operations. In Phase 1 we will be limited by our capacity and the need to focus on the confrontation areas but our wider deployment in Phase 2 should be influenced by the humanitarian and Human Rights priorities for access.
3. **CORE OUTPUTS**
4. The core outputs necessary to the achievement of the Objectives in Section D are at Annex E.
5. **STRATEGIC GUIDANCE TO COMPONENTS**
6. General. Cross pillar planning, thematic coordination and coordination with Carana authorities and the UN Country Team apply to all components so that UNAC delivers its mandate effectively. COS UNAC will detail the HQ coordination mechanisms.
7. Civilian Component. The Component will divide between DSRSG(Political) and DSRSG (HC/RC) to be more effective in delivering the mandate. The priority in Phase 1 will be to identify and engage with government and local leaders to establish situational awareness, explain UNAC’s purpose and build a level of trust which is essential for successful interactions.
8. Military Component. The initial effort is to be in ‘policing’ the ceasefire and disengagement. If this is effective it will create the confidence in the UN presence that will encourage the armed groups that they will be protected from the CDF when they disarm. The likely areas of confrontation will be the main effort until these groups have disarmed, thereafter resources can be tasked to other priorities in Carana.
9. Police Component. The initial effort is to be in Galsi to support the CNP in combatting criminal activity in the capital. Thereafter police capabilities should be provided for Muka and Faron to support existing local police capacities. HOPC is to identify how best the Police Component may support the planning and implementation of Police Reform and capacity building noting that this may require additional specialized capabilities on Phase 3 and 4.
10. **RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS**
11. The Mission Structure, Military Resources, Police Resources and Support Concept are at Annexes A-D.

ANNEXES


1. UNAC HQ Structure
2. Military Resources
3. Police Resources
4. Support Concept (not included)
5. Core Outputs for Each Objective

ANNEX A TO

UNAC MISSION CONOPS

DATED \_\_\_\_

**UNAC HQ STRUCTURE**

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In addition: Field Offices at Galasi, Muka and Faron

ANNEX B TO

UNAC MISSION CONOPS

DATED \_\_\_\_

**MILITARY RESOURCES**

UNAC will consist of up to 9,100 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 265 staff officers

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Ser** | **Type** | **Quantity** | **Remarks** |
| 1 | Force Headquarters | 1 | 130 pers incl Support |
| 2 | Sector HQ | 3 | 40 pers |
| **Support Troops** | | | |
| 3 | Signals Company | 1 | Includes comms for FHQ and 3 Sector HQs |
| 4 | Medium Transport Company | 2 |  |
| 5 | Aviation Squadron | 1 | Tps |
| 6 | Aviation Tactical Squadron | 1 | 2 Recce and 6 Attack Helicopters |
| 7 | Logistics Support Company | 2 |  |
| 8 | Engineer Company | 2 |  |
| 9 | Role 2 Hospital | 2 |  |
| **Maneuver Units** | | | |
| 10 | Motorised Infantry Battalions | 8 | One as Force Reserve |
| 11 | Mechanised Infantry Battalions | 1 |  |
| 12 | Mechanised Infantry Company | 2 |  |
| **UNMOs** | | | |
|  | Military Observers | 200 | Includes CMO and DCMO in FHQ |

ANNEX C TO

UNAC MISSION CONOPS

DATED\_\_\_\_\_

**POLICE RESOURCES**

Total Strength: 1250 police personnel plus 200 Corrections Officers

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Ser** | **Type** | **Quantity** | **Remarks** |
| 1 | Police Component HQ | 1 |  |
| 2 | Formed Police Units | 5 |  |
| 3 | Individual Police Officers | 510 |  |
| 4 | Cover for Specialist Teams | x |  |
| 5 | Corrections Officers | 200 |  |

ANNEX E TO

UNAC MISSION CONOPS

DATED\_\_\_\_\_

**MISSION OBJECTIVES AND OUTPUTS (extract)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **To support the implementation of the KPA**:  KPA irreversible as MPC and CISC no longer military entities, successful elections conducted and legitimate political processes recognized as the way to improve the conditions of all people in Carana | | | | |
|  | **OUTPUTS** | | | |
|  | Phase 1  Initial Deployment | Phase 2  Expansion | Phase 3  Consolidation | Phase 4  Capacity Building and Withdrawal |
| GNR implement DDR | Plan agreed by GNR and the parties | 50% Disarmed  20% Demobilised  10% Reintegrated  MPC and CISC volunteers for CDF identified | 100% Disarmed  80% Demobilised  40% Reintegrated  MPC and CISC volunteers mustered as CDF | 100% Disarmed  100% Demobilised  80% Reintegrated |
| MPC complying with KPA | < 5 major Ceasefire violations  MPC agree DDR plan | 50% of MPC disarmed  >20% demobilized  15% Reintegrated | 100% of MPC disarmed  >80% Demobilised / moved to CDF  <20% cantoned | 100 % Demobilised  0% cantoned |
| CISC complying with KPA | < 5 major Ceasefire violations | 50% of CISC disarmed  > 20% demobilized  7% Reintegrated | 100% of MPC disarmed  >80% Demobilised / moved to CDF  < 20% cantoned | 100 % Demobilised  0% cantoned |
| Free and fair Elections | GNR commit to free speech and creation of political parties | GNR have election plan (including logistics) | Election conducted in line with international standards |  |
| **To Protect Civilians:**  Civilians able to move freely within Carana. Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs at a level that can be neutralized by Carana security forces. | | | | |
|  | **OUTPUTS** | | | |
|  | Phase 1  Initial Deployment | Phase 2  Expansion | Phase 3  Consolidation | Phase 4  Capacity Building and Withdrawal |
| Civilian FOM within Carana | % area by Province | % area by Province | 100% | 100% |
| Reduction in illegal armed groups | Number of armed groups in Carana | Number of armed groups in Carana | Number of armed groups in Carana | Within national capacities to neutralise |
| Reduction in Criminal Gangs | % reduction in incidents in Galasi | % reduction in incidents in Galasi | % reduction in incidents in Galasi | Within national capacities to neutralise |
| **To support Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance**:  Security situation sufficient that UNCT and IO/NGOs can access all parts of Carana. | | | | |
|  | **OUTPUTS** | | | |
|  | Phase 1  Initial Deployment | Phase 2  Expansion | Phase 3  Consolidation | Phase 4  Capacity Building and Withdrawal |
| Humanitarian Access | Fellari, Guthar,Hana and Karin provinces | + 60% Koloni, 80%Mahbek and 50% of Leppko provinces | All provinces | All provinces |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **To support Security Sector Reform (SSR):**  CDF, CNP and other security institutions on a path to being ethnically representative, effective and accountable security institutions, that operate under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights. | | | | |
|  | **OUTPUTS** | | | |
|  | Phase 1  Initial Deployment | Phase 2  Expansion | Phase 3  Consolidation | Phase 4  Capacity Building and Withdrawal |
| GNR implement SSR | Plans agreed by parties and funded | International donors secured  Security budget for FY agreed |  |  |
| Military implement SSR | CDF new structure and estate agreed  Quotas allocated for MPC and CISC | Surplus members of CDF identified and redundancy package agreed  Plan for implementing CDF new structure etc agreed and funded | MPC and CISC volunteers mustered as CDF  CDF surplus departed  CDF in new structure  Training started in new structures |  |
| Police implement SSR | CNP new structure and estate agreed | Plan for implementing CNP new structure etc agreed and funded  CNP in 40% of Carana | CNP in 100% of Carana  CNP in new structure |  |
| Prison and Correction Service SSR |  | Review Prisons and Corrections service with GNR | Implement recommendations of review |  |
| **To support the wider implementation of the Peace Process:**  Through dialogue and engagement and supporting the creation of a protective environment UNAC has enabled national and local stake holders to commit to the peace process | | | | |
|  | **OUTPUTS** | | | |
|  | Phase 1  Initial Deployment | Phase 2  Expansion | Phase 3  Consolidation | Phase 4  Capacity Building and Withdrawal |
| To follow |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |